A. The Current Definition
The phrase "New World Order", like most slogans, is commonly used without definition.
The best way to tell what the term signifies to those who use it is to look at the measures carried out or called for in its name since the end of the Cold War, drawing the prevailing concept of the NWO out of them. Most of these measures involve peacemaking in various trouble spots or dangerous areas in the world--more specifically, actions to preserve or restore law and order, deter and/or stop and punish aggression and oppression, separate combatants and induce or compel them to stop fighting, relieve civilian suffering, and promote civil and human rights. There has been relatively little debate, at least in the United States, over whether these kinds of international actions are in theory legitimate and desirable under the NWO; the disagreement, as will be seen, mainly concerns their practical implications and consequences.
Thus a reasonable working definition of the NWO would be an international system in which the United States and like-minded friends and allies act under the aegis of the UN to preserve or establish peace by upholding international law and order against aggressors, lawbreakers and oppressors. Implicit in this definition is the notion that if the NWO is to survive and really work, the international community will in some cases have to proceed beyond persuasion, mediation, and conciliation to deterrence and compellence, the use of force. The NWO was born, according to many, out of a major collective war against Iraq as an aggressor. The actions taken since by the United States and other states in Iraq and Somalia and frequently proposed in regard to Bosnia all involve some use of armed force. Other coercive actions against other supposed aggressors and lawbreakers are often urged in the name of the NWO. The arguments for these measures--their humanitarian purposes, the dangers of neglecting the crises and letting violence, atrocities, and aggression continue unchecked, and the claim that they are called for and approved by the international community, above all the UN--assume the existence of a NWO with these aims, mandates, and requirements.
Few Americans reject the notion of such a NWO on principle or oppose all American participation in international efforts to promote peace and humanitarian causes, though they may express reservations (e.g., that noble intentions do not guarantee good results, that peacemaking efforts always serve particular interests and are easily abused and exploited for selfish ends, and that America has its own problems to solve before trying to meet those of the whole world). The main disagreement arises over attempts to uphold the NWO by force, compelling aggressors to stop what they are doing and disgorge their gains or forcing states to obey some law or code of international conduct supposedly set by the international community. Often the concerns are practical ones (the operation's sustainability, limits, chances of success, costs, risks, precedents, unintended consequences, etc.) But other challenges go to issues of principle. Who is to decide who is right among the parties in conflict, and by what right or principle? What gives UN resolutions the sanctity and force of law? Why should some resolutions be rigorously enforced and others not, some international crimes punished and others ignored?
Thus where Americans largely agree tacitly on the definition of the NWO as an international system designed to produce general compliance with certain standards of international conduct by various means, including the possible use of force, they sharply disagree over the reality, practicability, and desirability of this NWO in terms of actual outcomes. "Idealists," noting that civil, ethnic, and interstate conflict have expanded in the world following the end of the Cold War, argue that if the rule of law is not upheld now in critical instances like Bosnia or Iraq, this will encourage lawlessness and aggression, undermine the NWO, waste an historic opportunity to promote peace and justice, and promote new violence and conflict throughout the world. Meanwhile "realists", seeing the same problems and trends in the world, stress the difficulties, dangers, and unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences of such measures, the limited resources available to the United States and its allies, their divergences of view on many questions, the limits to American interests in many areas of the world, and the shaky juridical basis and controversial nature of all claims about international law and justice. Some "realists" conclude that the NWO is simply a mirage, that historic patterns of power politics, national conflict, and great-power rivalry still prevail in world politics, so that even for purposes of limiting war and preserving general peace it is better to reserve the use of American force solely for clearly defined and strictly limited American national interests.
Frequently in cases like this, key assumptions shared by both sides without their being fully aware of it go unarticulated and unchallenged, distorting and stultifying the debate. This essay is an attempt to articulate such a shared assumption. Its central contention is that where the two sides openly disagree about the NWO, i.e., about the likely consequences of acting or failing to act according to its supposed mandates and requirements, they are both right; and where they tacitly agree, in their definition or concept of the NWO, they are both wrong.
B. How Both Sides are Right about the NWO
To start with the idealists: they are right to insist that a genuinely new and effective NWO has emerged in the last fifty years, especially the last decade, and further right in believing that this NWO, if not sustained and developed, may break down at great cost and risk to the United States and the whole international community. One need not be an international historian to see that a new era in international relations has emerged since World War Two. In fact, the evidences of it are by now so familiar that we take them for granted and fail to see how startling they are in historical perspective. The signs include: the conversion of Germany and Japan in one generation from militarist, imperialist aggressors to stable, democratic industrial giants ambitious for trade and prosperity rather than military or political power; the economic and political integration and permanent pacification of Western Europe; the dismantling of the great European colonial empires, largely peacefully and voluntarily; the expansion of the UN to world-wide scope, the recognition of official juridical equality among its members, and its growth in reach and effectiveness for practical peacekeeping; the preservation of general peace (i.e., no system-wide wars and no all-out wars between major powers) through four decades of intense ideological and political competition between rival blocs, even while new powers were emerging and dangerous regional conflicts and rivalries constantly flared up; the gradual development of restraints on the arms race and the cooling of ideological rivalry even while this competition went on; 2 the admission of a host of new or transformed states into the world community; and finally, the end of the Cold War and the (till now, at least) generally peaceful dismantling and transformation of the Soviet empire. The point is not that this has yielded a brave new world free of war and upheaval. No one claims that; few if any think that such a world will ever come about. The point is rather that accomplishments such as this were unheard of and impossible in previous eras of history. When one adds to these developments others perhaps less spectacular or more disputable but nonetheless hopeful and progressive (e.g., democratization in Spain and Portugal, the end of apartheid in South Africa, progress toward ArabIsraeli peace, the astonishing economic and political development of the western Pacific Rim, the decline of dictatorships and rise of democracies in Latin America and elsewhere) the case for the existence of the NWO, i.e., a genuine new order of international politics, becomes overwhelming.
The historian's contribution to understanding this remarkable change is not (to repeat) to try to show that the more things have changed, the more they stay the same. This is the line some socalled realists take, insisting on the unchanging dominance of power politics and the primacy of the balance of power. The historian should know better. Granting that grave international problems and dangers still exist or will arise, what sensible person would exchange the current problems for those of ten, fifty, or a hundred years ago, or insist that they are really still the same? The international historian can indeed identify certain roots and antecedents of the NWO in history, can even (in my view) show that it is not solely the product of the last twenty or fifty years, but the climax of a long historical development stretching back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet the very historical insight which sees the NWO as the fruit of a long evolution highlights the contrast between this era and the past, emphasizing how the NWO now enables statesmen to manage problems and maintain a stable international order in ways which statesmen of previous eras could only dream of. Denying the fundamental differences between the world orders of previous centuries and that of today is like denying the changes in medical science over the same period.
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Yet on the other side, the "realist" critics are right to claim that current ways of using and sustaining the NWO are not working well, and if pursued much longer may harm both the NWO and world peace. Once again special historical knowledge is not required to see this or understand the reasons; in fact, political and social science, international relations theory, practical experience in international politics, and plain common sense work as well or better. The special contribution of history is first to point out that the idea of preserving peace and establishing a new international order through collectively enforcing international law against violators or imposing certain norms of international conduct on all actors, an old idea which goes back at least to the high Middle Ages and figures in most peace plans developed in the centuries since, 4 has regularly failed in history, proving ineffective and Utopian at best and productive of even greater violence and wider war at worst; and then to help show why the reasons for this persistent failure still prevail under the NWO today. The central reason, familiar to all scholars, is that making international politics into a confrontation between alleged lawbreakers and supposed enforcers of the law runs counter to the core of the international system which originated in Europe between the 15th and the 17th centuries and now embraces the whole world. That system, as the term "international politics" implies, presupposes the co-existence of independent states in juridically coordinate rather than superordinate and subordinate relations with each other, each claiming sovereignty, i.e., the sole right to proclaim and enforce the law within its own domains, and demanding recognition of that sovereignty from the others. Carried to its logical conclusion, the concept of the NWO as the collective enforcement of international law against transgressors fundamentally challenges and undermines this order, still the only one we have, and therefore must tend to provoke resistance and heighten conflict.
This shows up in international affairs in various ways, obvious and commonplace yet often overlooked. Tactically, this concept of "law enforcement" makes international confrontations and conflicts into something like a gunfight between the sheriff and the outlaws in a movie Western. Yet for purposes of limiting conflict and promoting peace in international affairs, force, if it is unavoidable, should be used as in judo rather than as in a gunfight. The object in judo, to use an aggressor's own force combined with a minimum effort of one's own to overbalance and disarm rather than destroy him, is better not only because it results in less violence and destruction, but also because a key assumption in an international system is that all essential actors should be preserved, because even an aggressive opponent, once curbed, has a necessary role to play. Psychologically, when sanctions imposed by the international community are portrayed as enforcing the law against violators, the honor as well as the interests of the accused party are impugned, giving it additional incentives to resist (for a government that cannot defend its honor often quickly loses its power) and effective propaganda to rally domestic support against outsiders. (Precisely this has happened in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.) Strategically, this outlook pulls the international community into pursuit of a vague, almost undefinable goal (when is the law sufficiently enforced, the lawbreaker adequately punished?). This raises the stakes for the international coalition in terms of its prestige and credibility, while leaving its means of enforcement limited and the concrete interests of its various members in the quarrel divergent--a sure prescription for disunity and defections.
Juridically, it encourages challenges to the legitimacy of the action which an aggressor can easily exploit. Practically, it engenders disputes over meeting and sharing the costs and burdens of enforcement, and fears that enforcing the law will result in more suffering and damage than the original alleged violation did.
All this, added to the fundamental reluctance of states to acknowledge an authority higher than themselves and thereby implicitly surrender their right to judge and defend their own cause, makes it clear that the NWO, so long as it is conceived as a collective effort to compel compliance with international law or the will of the international community, faces grave obstacles.
The conclusion seems to represent an impasse. The NWO is real and vitally important, as its defenders insist; yet the measures it apparently requires are unworkable, counterproductive, and dangerous, as its critics claim. The way out calls for rethinking the NWO.
C. The NWO: Not Compellence-Deterrence, but
Association-Exclusion
This rethinking begins with seeing that the NWO did not basically arise from successful compellence and deterrence, and does not mainly require these means to survive and work today.
The account offered here of how the NWO actually was born and has worked is, like the whole essay, brief, oversimplified, and doubtless controversial, but it rests on well-known historical facts.
The NWO as it emerged after World War Two was principally the product of a durable consensus among a sizeable number of major states and smaller powers, mostly Western Europe and well developed politically and economically, that certain kinds of international conduct (direct military aggression and threats, the undermining of foreign governments by subversion, economic practices considered tantamount to economic warfare, and even some forms of civil war or internal oppression) had to be ruled out as incompatible with their general security and welfare. They formed various associations based on this consensus, designed both to deter external actions or threats of this kind and to promote a different kind of international conduct among themselves, i.e., to encourage political and economic cooperation and integration, expand trade and communication, resolve conflicts peacefully, and promote broad political participation, civil and human rights, and the economic and social welfare of the member states. The various associations and institutions created for these purposes (the Western European Union, Benelux, NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Community, EFTA, and others) proved over time not only durable, able to withstand external challenges and internal disintegration, but also successful in promoting prosperity, political stability, and democratic freedoms among the members themselves. As a result, these kinds of association promoting these patterns of conduct became a leading model for international politics in the developed world and much of the developing world, tending to pull other states toward it and to undermine associations and practices hostile to it.
The story is familiar; the historian's contribution is again to emphasize how new and unprecedented this development was and remains. A rough rule of thumb on alliances and associations in European international history is this: in the 17th century, all alliances worked almost purely as instruments of power politics, i.e., self-defense, war, and territorial expansion, even when ostensibly created for other purposes, e.g., religion or dynastic unions, and all were highly unreliable, no matter how solemnly sworn and guaranteed or expensively purchased with subsidies and bribes--so much so that it was impossible to calculate when or under what circumstances an ally was likely to defect. By the 18th century, alliances and associations, though still oriented almost exclusively to power politics, had grown more reliable, but not much more durable. They lasted only so long as they served the special interests of the contracting parties and so long as other more profitable alliances were not available. Thus 18th century statesmen, in concluding alliances, had to try to calculate roughly when and under what circumstances an ally would defect. 19th and earlier 20th century alliances became much more durable, but still normally served the power-political ends of defense against enemies and acquisition of special advantages. Since they primarily served these purposes, their very durability and reliability, and the resultant rigidity of alliance systems, became a prime cause of war, especially World War One. With certain exceptions, it proved impossible in these earlier eras to erect and sustain durable, effective associations to promote the common good and general peace. 5 Only the late 20th century has seen durable international alliances and associations of a new kind, directed not simply against common dangers, but also for common constructive purposes; controlling the international conduct of the members themselves and making overt war among them unthinkable; valuable enough that members hardly think any longer of abandoning them, and that outsiders want to join them rather than weaken or break them up. More than anything else, it is this startling change in the structure, purposes, and uses of international alliances and associations which makes the NWO new.
In contrast, the collective action which supposedly gave birth to the NWO, the Gulf War,
was not new at all. One can give the Bush administration full marks for skillful diplomacy in forming and sustaining the coalition. Nonetheless, this was normal, old-fashioned power politics, basically no different from other military coalitions against, for example, Louis XIV, Hitler, or Napoleon. Nor was it unique in its success. On Napoleon's return from Elba in 1815, in an era of much slower communications and inferior military technology, the allies formed an even wider coalition still more quickly and won a quicker, more brilliant, more complete, and more durable military success against a more serious foe.
To be sure, compellence and deterrence were not absent from the emergence and the operation of the NWO; some have claimed they were decisive in its creation. According to this view, united military action by a huge allied coalition destroyed Nazi and Japanese imperialism in World War II; military defeat and occupation plus forced democratization and economic liberalization transformed Germany and Japan; the threat of Soviet expansion and subversion compelled Western Europe to integrate, and American leadership, economic aid, and military protection made that integration possible; the Western system of political and economic freedom was able to demonstrate its superiority over Communism only because NATO held the West together and kept Soviet imperialism at bay; and finally, it was American military and economic superiority that defeated the USSR in the Cold War, causing its internal change of course, the collapse of its empire, and the downfall of Communism itself in rapid succession.
The case looks plausible, but it rests on turning a contributing factor or, at most, a necessary but not sufficient condition in the rise of the NWO into the main cause. Compellence and deterrence may have been indispensable at certain points in the process, but their role was still an ancillary one. Force cleared away obstacles to positive changes; it did not produce the changes themselves, and carried too far, it could obstruct them. In exaggerating the role played by coercive force in building the NWO, this view obscures the real creative power behind it, which was a broad process of political and cultural learning. This process of collective learning shows most clearly in the defeated enemies of World War II, but it also worked profoundly throughout the Western community, and spread eventually far beyond it.
The process involved absorbing and internalizing two lessons. The first was a widespread recognition of failure, a realization that traditional ways of pursuing vital national and societal goals would not work, had intolerable consequences, and must be abandoned. The second involved devising other kinds of processes and institutions to achieve national goals that went beyond normal power politics, and deciding to try them. In a word, the NWO emerged when a critical mass of the international system's member states and peoples learned to repudiate the old power-political methods of achieving security and welfare and worked out new and different means for doing so.
This formula, though oversimplified, fits all the major post-World War Two achievements proving the NWO a reality--both those changes now permanent and irreversible (in Germany, Japan, Britain, France, other former colonial powers, Western Europe in general, and the Western Pacific rim), those changes underway in Eastern Europe, and those apparently starting in the Middle East, Africa, China, India and Pakistan, and Central and South America. In every case of such collective learning, even where compellence and deterrence, coercive force, may have played a role, it was never decisive. Germany and Japan were not really forced by armed coercion to become democratic members of a liberal capitalist world system; they were rather brought by the hard experience of disastrous failure, including military defeat and occupation, to recognize that their former strategies of imperialism, militarism, and autarky could not make them secure, prosperous, and great. Presented with the chance to try an alternative route to security and prosperity, they chose to earn their way back into the international community by it. Many of the forcible measures originally proposed to transform Germany and Japan into safe members of the world community were, fortunately, never carried out--a sweeping partition and total demilitarization of Germany, its and do what we tell you instead, or we will punish you as a lawbreaker," and saying, "What you are now doing or threatening to do is going to fail and will eventually hurt you as well as us. The price of your continuing to try it will be to bar you from our group and cut you off from its benefits. But if you change your policy you can stay in the group, or keep your chance of joining it." It is just as easy to see the tactical, strategic, and economic advantages of this approach.
Again, it is clear that this kind of pressure actually promoted the NWO. Germany and Japan were compelled to become liberal and democratic not by force (a contradiction in terms in any case), but by the knowledge that this was the price of association with the West and its markets, military security, and respectability. Britain and France were not forced to decolonize by the United States; 
D. Some Implications for Policy
Changing the way we think about the NWO and its operation affects our goals, priorities, and expectations in its regard. If it developed and works not by enforcing international law and punishing violators, but by forming and maintaining associations which reward those who conform to group norms and exclude those who do not, then the main goal of policy under the NWO should be sustaining this process of association and exclusion. This sounds like a mere truism, but has specific, important implications. It means that our prime concern in regard to the NWO should not be how it can be used in particular problem areas to advance particular ends, values, and interests, even vital ones like peace, democracy, and human rights, but rather to make sure that the NWO itself is preserved and developed, for its own sake. The NWO, in other words, must be viewed as an end in itself, the necessary means and condition for other vital ends and values. We accept this logic in other contexts. We understand, for example, that the most basic concern in our domestic politics is upholding the Constitution and the democratic process, as the foundation for free domestic politics. We know that agreements and institutions like GATT, the IMF, the World Bank, the Group of Seven, and others have to be maintained not just to promote economic prosperity or cure hardship in our own country or others we care about, but as components of a world economic order vital for prosperity generally. The same principle applies to international relations: the NWO has intrinsic and not mere instrumental value.
This applies a fortiori to the associations which produced the NWO and make it effective.
The UN, which once could be dismissed as merely a useful talking shop or meeting place handy for certain purposes, has become valuable in its own right as an integral part of the NWO. This is even A recognition of the intrinsic value of the NWO and the need to strengthen it by preserving and developing the associations and mechanisms which support it suggests in turn a simple, practical rule of thumb for policy. Each time anyone proposes that the UN, the European Community, the United States and its allies, or some other international group carry out some mission or measure in the name of the NWO, the first question must be: is this action compatible with the nature, central mission, and special methods of the NWO? If so, and if the mission is also desirable and practical per se, then it is worth considering; if not, then not. In other words, we must stop expecting and demanding that the NWO perform tasks it was not designed to do, which would wreck it if seriously tried, and then denouncing it or despairing of it when these missions are not undertaken or the effort fails.
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This happens repeatedly. The UN and/or some other international community or authority is constantly called on to intervene in civil wars and ethnic conflicts, restore civil order, alleviate starvation, break illegal blockades, settle territorial disputes, impose armistices on warring parties, stop internal oppression and violations of civil rights, establish war-crimes tribunals and punish war criminals, punish countries for defying UN resolutions or supporting terrorism, etc.--on the tacit assumption that the NWO makes these tasks necessary and possible. Name any international evil or problem, and it is a safe bet that someone has called on the NWO to solve it, and denounced the world community or proclaimed the demise of the NWO for its failure to do so. Such proposals, as already noted, are often resisted on practical grounds, especially their costs and risks for the United
States, but little or nothing is said about their appropriateness for the NWO, and the effects of burdening it with assignments unsuited to its mission and methods.
This perspective also calls for some faith in the NWO and patience with the process of association and exclusion by which it works, and for allowing it sufficient time and steady application to work. It is simply unreasonable to argue, for example, that if there were a real NWO the international community would long since have acted to bring the fighting in Bosnia to an end, stop "ethnic cleansing" and other atrocities, relieve the suffering of civilians, settle territorial and other disputes, and create or salvage a viable Bosnian state. it is possible to argue that more could have done earlier to achieve these ends through diplomacy or other means, or to argue in reply that these goals were out of reach from the beginning, given the circumstances and the attitudes and aims of the various parties involved. In any case, regardless of their inherent desirability or undesirability, feasibility or unfeasibility, these are not now and never were the kinds of tasks the NWO is designed or suited to carry out, and they must not be made the test of its existence and
worth. An understanding of how the NWO emerged and what it can do precludes expecting it to be able to force warring sides to a negotiated settlement, or try and punish war criminals, or compel determined governments and armies to give up their conquests, or restore a territorial or political settlement already overthrown by force.
This does not make the NWO useless in situations like Bosnia--only different in its operation and functions. The real task of the NWO in Bosnia and the Balkans as a whole, and the real, legitimate test of its existence and worth there, lie ahead of it, after the current conflict has somehow been "settled". The test will then be whether Serbia and Croatia, winners in this struggle, come in five or ten years to be sorry that they ever waged it and desperate to escape its long-range consequences. The task and function of the NWO will be to make both states pay a high price after In any case, the final test for the NWO in Bosnia is not whether this strategy ultimately works as desired, but whether the European powers and others, including the United States, are willing seriously to try it. The fact that the UN's peacemaking efforts have failed to this point is irrelevant, proves nothing as to the reality and effectiveness of the NWO. Should the international community fail to use its weapons of association and exclusion against Serbia and Croatia once the fighting is over, however, this would raise grave doubts about its reality and effectiveness, signal clearly that the United States and other leading states do not understand the NWO or trust its efficacy, and prefer the old power politics instead.
E. Some Objections
Certain criticisms of this view need some brief discussion, less to refute them than to avoid misunderstandings and correct false impressions.
One has surely already been answered: that this policy is soft and sentimental, ignoring the harsh realities of international politics to rely on sweet reason and moral suasion for peace and stability. A policy which subordinates the promotion of justice, civil and human rights, international law, the prevention of innocent suffering, and even the prevention of local wars to the maintenance of a particular impersonal system and process in international politics, and which expressly advocates the exclusion of successful aggressors from the international community and the imposition of a heavy price for their policies on their peoples, is instead if anything too ruthless and hard-boiled.
A more plausible objection is that this reflects an academic concept of how human beings learn and the world works, a belief that history can teach peoples and states the errors of their ways and induce them to change, when in fact people generally learn what they want to from history, mostly the wrong things or nothing at all, and some leaders in particular (Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic, for example) are totally indifferent to "lessons of history," care little or nothing about the costs of their failures so long as they do not have to pay themselves, and can keep their state machines and essential followers under control while making the masses pay and deceiving them into blaming the outside world for their sufferings.
This sounds good, but it misreads the message. This is not at all an argument that we should let history teach Saddam Hussein or Milosevic that aggression does not pay. Of course history, left to itelf, does not work well this way. It can indeed "teach" whatever lessons one wants it to, including the lesson that aggression does pay. The argument instead is that under the NWO we can now do what past generations could not: deliberately make history serve our purposes, acting in deliberate, organized fashion to induce whole governments and peoples to recognize failure and want change, by means other than external armed force. The desired outcome is not a sort of moral and religious repentance and conversion, the conviction that ethnic and religious conflict is wicked and that living together in peace and mutual tolerance is good. Of course many peoples resist learning this from history; the past which all too many of them know, cling to, and insist on living in often teaches an opposite lesson. As the historian Lewis B. Namier remarks, Freud's definition of neurosis, to be "dominated by unconscious memory, fixated upon the past, and unable to overcome it" is the regular condition of historical communities 8 --an insight illustrated by many trouble spots of today, including the Balkans. Instead, the strategy of exclusion and denial is a way of helping states and peoples to get over their history, break out of it. Repeated, long-term experience of failure is a powerful teacher, above all of the insight that unless one breaks with the past, there can be no tolerable present or future.
3) The most powerful criticism, however, is the charge of ineffectiveness. The incentives and sanctions provided by this version of the NWO, association-benefits and exclusion-denial, seem to many simply too weak to be relied on for a stable world order. They will not work against dictators Hence an aggression that must be stopped immediately, a crisis that cannot be allowed to erupt into war, or atrocities simply too horrible to be allowed to continue may require something quicker--with the strictures and reservations discussed above. Yet (to reiterate) among the new capacities of the NWO is the capacity to speed up such changes and make them more predictable than in the past. peoples, perhaps in some respects more. We deny this cardinal need and responsibility whenever we say in effect, "The United States cannot follow this or that policy in international affairs, even though it is necessary and legitimate, because the American people will not support it and the American political system makes it impossible to sell it to them." What we really say by this is that we want to run the NWO and enjoy its benefits, but not belong to it, or change and grow with it. In other words, we are stupid and inconsistent, and prefer to stay that way. A nation which uses that excuse for very long must sooner or later excuse itself into disaster. 5 . Even the two most important exceptions really prove the rule.
The German Confederation of 1815-66 was originally founded both to provide for the common defense of its members, the various independent German states, and to promote their joint welfare in various ways. Yet its leaders, especially Austria, quickly stultified its potential for advancing the general welfare, for particular Austrian reasons, and after 1848 it could no longer even serve for common defense and for reconciling power-political differences between its members, especially Prussia and Austria.
Similarly, the European Concert worked well from 1815 to 1853 to preserve international peace, but mostly failed as a way of promoting a common approach to more general European political and social problems. Even where, as often happened, the great powers did not mainly try to exploit the conflicts for selfish ends but cooperated to regulate and end them, they always were concerned to preserve a favorable balance of power.
The most obvious feature of the current international response is that this long-dominant motive has almost totally It is one thing to emphasize the tragedy of the current situation for Bosnians and many others on all sides; another to claim that unless the international community under the NWO does something immediately effective to fix it, the NWO is useless and the world has learned nothing. This very situation, for all its horrors,
